Leger v. Williams, 2026 BCCA 300: BC Court of Appeal Resets the Framework for Unilateral Relocations Under the Family Law Act
On July 13, 2026, the British Columbia Court of Appeal released Leger v. Williams, 2026 BCCA 300, allowing a mother's appeal from a Provincial Court order that had required her to return her young son from New Brunswick to Terrace, BC. Writing for a unanimous panel (Fisher JA, with Abrioux JA and DeWitt-Van Oosten JA concurring), the Court set aside the Return Order and remitted the matter for a fresh hearing, holding that the application judge had approached the case as a challenge to why the mother left rather than as a forward-looking analysis of the child's best interests.
For BC parents, family lawyers, and anyone navigating a move-away dispute where no prior parenting order is in place, the decision is an important corrective on how sections 46 and 47 of the Family Law Act are meant to operate.
The Facts
The parties lived together in a marriage-like relationship at the Kitsumkalum Reserve near Terrace, BC from September 2023 until March 2025. Their son was born in April 2024. The mother is from New Brunswick; the father is Kitsumkalum. There was no prior court order or written agreement about parenting time.
On March 3, 2025, when the child was 11 months old, the mother left Terrace with him and travelled to her family's home in New Brunswick without giving the father notice. She alleged a pattern of psychological and emotional abuse during the relationship. On March 20, 2025, the father filed a Priority Parenting Matter in the Provincial Court under Part 4 of the Family Law Act, seeking the child's return to Terrace.
After a hearing, the Provincial Court judge issued a Return Order on July 11, 2025 requiring the mother to bring the child back to Terrace within six weeks. The mother's appeal to the Supreme Court of British Columbia was dismissed on March 13, 2026 (Leger v. Williams, 2026 BCSC 429). She then obtained leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
What the Court Decided
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set the Return Order aside. Justice Fisher identified three overlapping errors in the application judge's reasoning.
First, the judge allowed the mother's reasons for moving to overwhelm the analysis. Under Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, and the long-standing framework in Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 SCR 27, a parent's motive for relocating is relevant only insofar as it bears on the child's best interests going forward. It is not a threshold the moving parent must clear before the court will consider the merits of the proposed living arrangement. As Fisher JA put it, the judge "focused on the reasons for the move to the exclusion of the forward-looking analysis the Family Law Act requires" [at para 62].
Second, the judge failed to conduct a genuine best-interests analysis under s. 37 of the Family Law Act. That analysis is comparative: it requires the court to weigh the child's likely circumstances if he remains where the moving parent has taken him against his likely circumstances if he is returned. The application judge did neither in any meaningful way. He made no findings about the child's day-to-day life in New Brunswick, the parenting each household could provide, or the practical viability of the father exercising parenting time from Terrace.
Third, the judge implicitly assumed that the mother would return to Terrace with the child if the Return Order were made — an assumption directly contrary to s. 46(2)(b) of the Family Law Act, which forbids the court from considering "whether the guardian who is planning to move would do so without the child." That statutory rule protects primary caregivers, particularly those alleging family violence, from being coerced into staying put by a judicial thumb on the scale.
The Court declined to substitute its own order. Because no proper best-interests findings had been made, the appropriate remedy was to remit the matter to the Provincial Court for a fresh hearing on a full evidentiary record.
What This Means for BC Clients
Leger does not create new law, but it is a firm reminder of how the Family Law Act is supposed to operate when one parent moves with a child before any order is in place.
If you are considering a move with your child, or if the other parent has recently relocated with your child, the window to obtain sound advice is short. Contact Sinclair Centre Law for an initial consultation with our family law team.
- The starting question is always the child's best interests going forward, not whether the moving parent had "good enough" reasons to leave.
- Section 46(2)(b) means courts must analyze the case as it actually stands — with the moving parent living where they say they will live — rather than assuming the parent will retreat if pressed.
- Where family violence is alleged, courts must engage with those allegations as part of the s. 38 factors, not sidestep them by focusing on the mechanics of the move.
- For left-behind parents, the case is a caution that a Return Order will not be granted on the strength of surprise or unilateral action alone; the moving parent's proposed arrangement must be tested on its own merits.

